Demonstration of an improved passive acoustic fault detection method on recordings from the Phénix steam generator operating at full power. Abstract A hidden Markov model method proposed earlier for passive acoustic leak detection in sodium fast reactor systems has been improved in order to clarify how to set all free model parameters and to allow smaller amounts of training data. The method is based on training the model on known background noise only and optimizing its free model parameters by a parametric study of detection performance for synthetic noises superposed onto the same background. This means that the method is not assuming any knowledge on the noise to be detected and may be used as a general fault detection method, even if the application envisaged here is leak detection for sodium fast reactors. Using recordings of background noise as well as from argon injection tests performed at full power in the Phénix sodium fast reactor plant, it is estimated that the resulting method will detect leak-like deviations from the background noise with a detection delay of a few seconds, a false alarm rate close to 10 −8 per second and at signal-to-noise ratio conditions at least corresponding to an additive signal at -10 dB. The method is one-channel, i.e. using input from one single acoustic sensor only.
Introduction
Sodium fast reactors (SFRs) are fast reactor designs using liquid sodium as coolant. As, almost without exception, all nuclear power plants use steam turbines to drive the generator set, existing SFRs use or have used sodium heated steam generators to transfer energy from the secondary to the tertiary circuit [1] . Sodium heated steam generators however present an inherent risk in the case of a leak between its two circuits. As sodium and water have a quite violent chemical reaction, releasing additional heat and corrosive reaction products, such a leak can damage other steam generator tubes nearby and create a self-accelerating damage process [2] . The task of detecting leaks has therefore always been important for SFR steam generator monitoring equipment, generally achieved through the use of chemical hydrogen detection systems with relatively slow response [6] . Acoustic leak detection systems have been an interesting alternative for a long time due to their much shorter response times and relative simplicity but have never reached further than the experimental stage. Some overviews of work on the topic can be found in [2] and [5] .
Within the ASTRID project [14] , the Commisariat a l'Énergie Atomique et auxÉnergies alternatives (CEA) is currently studying the option of using a Brayton cycle energy conversion system with nitrogen as tertiary fluid. The steam generators would in this design be replaced by compact sodium-nitrogen heat exchangers. Even if the risk of violent chemical reaction is thereby excluded, hydrodynamic effects affecting both safety and performance of the heat exchanger, as well as the risk of a gas leak over to the primary system still motivate using a leak detection system as part of the continuous monitoring equipment.
The noises of small leaks will be due to aeroacoustic jet noise, fluid-structure interaction, sodium-water reaction (for the steam generator case) and the acoustic effects of bubble populations (absorption, scattering, diffusion and resonance) [3] , [4] . The relative importance of these effects will depend on the leak rate, leak geometry, ambient conditions as well as the acoustic wave propagation path from the leak position to the acoustic sensor. Furthermore, neither measurement nor experimental simulation of realistic leak signals in a nuclear power plant are assumed to be possible. These facts taken together motivate aiming for a method that learns to recognize normal operation background noise and detects leaks as a deviation from this known noise.
In this work we develop such a method, based on a hidden Markov model (HMM) concept proposed in [8] . The performance is assessed by applying it to recordings from argon injection tests performed in the Phénix steam generator at full power. Section 2 contains a description of these tests and the recording data. Section 3 describes the improved hidden Markov model detector method and how detector performance is measured. The results, presented in section 4, starts with a short discussion of what is actually detected in the Phénix recordings. Then, a study of detector parametrizations is made, and the results of this study in detection of synthetic testing signals superposed on the background noise are used to choose a detector parametrization. A final demonstration is then made on the argon injection data as well as on pure background noise. Detection delay, false alarm rate and detectable additive signal to noise ratio (SNR) for the proposed method are all estimated.
Discussion of the method and our results as well as conclusions and some ideas for future work are given in section 5 and 6. Initially, 600 s of normal full-power background noise was recorded with a sampling rate of 25600 samples/s. Then, argon injection recordings were made at a doubled sampling rate. Several injections of various durations and driving pressures were performed, with typical argon flow rates around 10 g/s. In each test, the injection was started at 30 s after the recording start and lasted from 5 to 60 s. Six of the resulting recordings will be studied here. Characteristics of the analyzed recordings are shown in table 1 and the raw signals are shown in figure 2. Figure 3 shows the corresponding time-frequency evolution up to the Nyquist frequency of 12.8 kHz. For the signal on sensor 1, located closest to the injection point, figure 4 shows power spectral density (PSD) estimates of the signal in the background noise region as well as in the 5 argon injection regions. From figures 3 and 4 it is clear that the injections lead both to acoustic emission and absorption.
Detection method

Improved HMM detector
Hidden Markov models with Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) as emission probabilitites have been widely used in various speech recognition applications [11] . The actual data modeled for human speech is often so-called mel frequency cepstrum coefficients, extracted from the measured audio signal in a way that imitates the functioning of the human ear [12] . For our application, i.e. fault detection in industrial acoustic noise signals, a new feature calculation scheme based on the Welch PSD estimate [7] was presented in [8] along with some basic HMM theory. A brief review of this basic theory and the new feature calculation scheme explicitly stating the improvements that are new to this work will now be given.
Hidden Markov models assume that an observable stochastic signal (or array of signals) is created by a sequence of non-observable states s m , with the Markov property P (s m+1 |s m , s m−1 , ..., s 0 ) = P (s m+1 |s m )
i.e. where the probability of passing from one step to another is only dependent on the current state. The right hand side of equation 1 is also generally constant in time, i.e. there is a constant matrix of transition probabilities A = [a ij > 0] describing the probabilities of passing from state i to state j in one timestep. If the total number of possible states is S, it is required by definition that
In addition to A, a vector of initial probabilities for the S states is needed for a complete description of the Markov sequence. The probability distribution of the observable output is often modeled by a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) i.e.
B(F)
where k max is the number of observed data sequences in F (commonly called features), C g is the covariance matrix of F and µ g the average values of F. The weights w g are normalized to obtain
The complete parametrization of a hidden Markov model can then be written
where π denotes a vector containing the hidden state start probabilities. We now remind the reader that the model parameters of an HMM, i.e. the matrix A, the initial vector π as well as the weights w g of B are set by applying a so-called training algorithm to an observed feature sequence F(m). The training is done by local likelihood maximization using the Baum-Welch algorithm [11] . When presented with a new feature sequence, it is then possible to calculate a conditional probability that the observed sequence is generated by the trained model, by a recursive algorithm [12] . In practice, the logarithm of this conditional probability is used in order to avoid computation problems due to small numbers. I.e. after training a model λ bg on acoustic normal operation background noise, the following expression is used as a discriminant for fault detection
i.e. the discriminant value at time window m is calculated recursively using feature data from M steps back in time.
To create the feature sequence F(m), we will use the power spectral density (PSD). For the PSD to be useful, some care has to be taken in how to estimate it. A basic way of estimating the PSD X(f, N ) of a time-discrete signal x(t n ) based on a finite time window of length N samples at sampling frequency f s is given by
which is called the periodogram. This measure has two main drawbacks: Firstly, it does not converge to the true PSD when N approaches infinity, and secondly it has so-called spectral leakage, meaning that some of the true power in a frequency band will instead appear in adjacent frequency bands. A common way of overcoming both these drawbacks is the Welch method [7] which consists of using a windowing function h(t n ), splitting the window into overlapping subwindows of length N sw and calculating the final PSD estimate over several expressions of the form
Throughout this work, the Welch method, with h equal to the Hamming windowing function and subwindows of length N sw = 0.4N samples overlapping each other by 0.2N samples will be used for PSD estimates.
We denote the PSD estimate of the time discrete signal x(t n ) with X(f j ), where t n are the signal sampling times and f j are the frequency bands. The average PSD of a normal operation signal is denoted X 0 . We monitor the residual XR from this model over sliding time windows of constant length tw, enumerated by m and we propose a componentwise normalization of the residual, i.e.
Contrary to the normalization used in [8] , this residual will not be indifferent to pure multiplicative changes in the signal (i.e. X(f j , m) → kX(f j , m)) since X 0 is constant. An important question is whether this makes the detection system more prone to false alarms in the case that multiplicative signal changes should occur often. We believe that such changes would most likely be generated by faults in the detection system [9] and not by faults in the monitored system. Thereby, they can be avoided by thorough detection system design and, if needed, detected by a dedicated separate algorithm.
In each time window, a vector of PSD component indices ordered by current residual size is also created, i.e.
where the integer k enumerates its components. Based on XR(f j , m) and J k (m) we now introduce a modified feature calculation scheme compared to the one of [8] , given by
The second term on the right represents the log of the total power deviation over all studied frequencies while the first term, for each k, points out the frequency band at which the PSD estimate is currently deviating the most, secondmost, thirdmost etc. from its average value on the training data. The first term takes on discrete values from 1 to j max . The second term, which takes on real number values, is rescaled to cover approximately the same domain by calculating the factor β according to
where
and
i.e. µ d XR and σ XR represents the estimated mean and standard deviation respectively of the expression in equation 14 over the training data.
The relative importance factor of the first and second term of the feature, β, was in our previous work set by an ad-hoc trial and error procedure [8] . Since we are aiming for a method to be licensed for safety related systems in nuclear power plants, basing the method on well-defined and predictable procedures is of utmost importance. The introduction of equation 12 in this respect represents an important improvement of the scheme. Furthermore, the new normalization of equation 9 has been introduced in order to allow considerably smaller amounts of data in the training sequence while maintaining detector performance. In [8] , training periods of about one minute were needed to provide sufficient statistics to the Baum-Welch algorithm for a signal sampled at 200 kS/s. Using the scheme presented here, training periods of 20 s were sufficient, even on the signals with a sampling frequency of 25600 S/s, i.e. a reduction by a factor of 24 of the amount of training data needed. These results may be somewhat dependent on the HMM library used (in our case, it is the library for Matlab described in [12] ) but the improvement is still considered important.
In [8] , the model quality was studied as a function of the HMM parameters only by reapplying the trained models to testing data on the same signal type. Here we will instead study the actual detection performance as a function of both the free model, and the free feature scheme parameters. The full set of studied parameters then becomes:
• The sliding window length tw
• The size of the feature vector, k max
• The number of Gaussians in the GMM, G
• The number of states in the HMM, S
Detector performance measures
A standard way of assessing the performance of a discriminant for detection is to calculate a receiver operating characteristic, or ROC, curve [13] . A common scalar measure of the detection performance is the area under the ROC curve. For detectors that have maximal area under the ROC curve, this measure can not be used to distinguish their performance. We therefore also use a min-max margin measure, similar to the one used in [16] . For discriminants d that are designed to decrease at the onset of detection, this measure is defined by
where d 1 and d 0 are the discriminant outputs in a known detection region and a known normal background region, respectively. Care should however be taken in using this measure for comparison of discriminants defined differently, as e.g. simple operations such as squaring of the output will result in a different mmd.
In this work we will use it uniquely for comparison of discriminants resulting from different HMM sizes. 
Results
In recordings 2-6, the training period used for each sensor channel ranged from t = 5s to t = 20s into the signal, for reasons that will be clear later. For recording 1, a training period from 120 to 220 seconds was used. The average background PSD estimate X 0 and the feature sequence F(m) used for training of HMMs was thus calculated on these periods.
Physical interpretation
It is instructive to study the nature of the acoustic signals by some basic change measure before going on to testing of the more sensitive HMM method. By listening to the actual recording from sensor 1 it was found that a tone-like sound appears a few seconds before the response in the higher frequencies. The proposed interpretation of this fact is that the injection itself creates a fairly weak low-frequency whistle and then the argon bubbles, a little later, create a high-frequency "trickle" noise as well as acoustic absorption as they reach the acoustic sensor position.
As a simple demonstration, the discriminant defined by equation 14 was calculated for low (0 -2 kHz) and high (21 -26.5 kHz) frequencies on recordings 2-6 from sensor 1. The resulting log power deviations are shown in figure 5 . We found that the response of the low-frequency discriminant appears 5-7 seconds before the high-frequency discriminant.
Next, the high-frequency deviation discriminants of recording 2 are shown for all sensors in figure 6 . Here, it can be seen that the response is somewhat delayed for each sensor, and extended for sensors 2-5, corresponding to a hypothesis of argon bubbles traveling trough the steam generator and spreading out. The delays are larger from sensor 1 to 2 as well as from sensor 4 to 5. This corresponds well to the positioning of the sensors and the piping configuration (c.f. figure 1) where the bubbles pass through the longer S-shaped tubes only between sensors 1 and 2 and sensors 4 and 5. From sensor 2, at the reheater sodium outlet, to sensor 4 at the evaporator inlet, the bubbles travel through shorter piping, bypassing the superheater S-tubes. The secondary sodium inventory of the Phénix plant was about 140000 kg per loop and the secondary sodium flowrate was about 800 kg/s. From these values, a sodium circulation period time for the secondary circuit of about 175 s is found. It is however reasonable to assume that some of the secondary sodium remained stationary in a storage tank and did not circulate, thus leading to a shorter period time. The fluctuations seen in the response of the first sensor about 150 s after injection start in figure 6 can therefore probably be attributed to argon bubbles returning after completing one lap in the secondary circuit.
Parameter study on synthetic test signals
The parameters studied are listed in table 2. The values for the sliding window length are defined by numbers yielding an integer number of windows (the M of equation 6) on one second of data (at the lower sampling rate of 25.6 kHz). The cases having S = 1 represent pure GMMs, i.e. they lack time evolution modeling and are technically not hidden Markov models.
If the best detector would have to be found by a parametric study on injection noise data similar to recordings 2-6, the method would not be independent of such data. Instead, an approach where synthetic testing signals are superposed onto the normal background noise will be used here, i.e.
x(t 1 , ..., t 2 ) = x bg (t 1 , ..., t 2 ) + Cx test (16) where C is a constant factor and the testing sigal duration t 2 − t 1 was chosen to be 100 seconds. The first testing signal was a white Gaussian noise and the second one was a stationary signal with stochastic phase, created from a PSD of the background noise, using the same method as in [16] . The latter case is in some respect limiting, as it corresponds to detection of a stationary noise which has maximal resemblance to the background. For signals superposed in this way, an advantage is that the resulting signal-to-noise ratio can be controlled by the factor C and straightforwardly calculated from the definition SN R = 10 log 10 P test P bg (17) where P test and P bg are the signal powers of Cx test and x bg respectively. A measure of the signal power is obtained by summing the PSD components up to the Nyquist frequency. Putting ourselves in the position of having to parametrize the detector without acces to injection test data we now demonstrate an example of how this can be done using only the synthetic testing signals and a simplistic parameter study. During this study, the background-like noise was added at SN R = −2 dB and the white Gaussian noise at SN R = −28 dB. The min-max distance is shown as function of time window length in figure 7 . A local maximum is present at 2560 samples. We believe it is reasonable to fix the time window length first, as it is a parameter related to the non-stationarity of the signal, which is after all what we hope to model by using an HMM. Now restricting ourselves to parametrizations with tw = 2560 and S > 1 (i.e. models that have a time evolution), the min-max distance is shown as function of k max in figure  8 . The performance can be seen to be split into two groups, corresponding to the two testing signals. For k max values larger than 1 there is no clear trend, but the performance seems to deteriorate at k max = 4, so we choose k max = 2 to promote simpler feature sequences. Finally, the performance as function of G and S is shown in figure 9 . Larger models are seen to give slightly higher min-max distance. In a future application, more testing signals could be studied and a more sophisticated approach based on the response surface could be used to pick the parametrization with optimal performance. As the amount of training data was in some cases slightly too small for the larger values of G and the spread in performance seem to increase at S = 4, we here chose tw = 2560, k max = 2, G = 3 and S = 3 as the final parametrization. Since tw = 2560 yields 10 sliding windows per second at 25600 samples per second, we will denote this model by HMM10233.
Detectable SNR studies
In another study, the detectable SNR for the HMM10233 was studied, defining "detectable" as cases having a min-max distance larger than 1, i.e maximal area under the ROC. When analyzing the synthetic testing signals, the detectable signal power was found by gradually decreasing the superposition factor C of equation 16 and thereby also the SNR as calculated by equation 10. For the 8 bar argon injection signals, a changed SNR was first estimated on the raw signal according to
where X 0 and X 1 are the average PSD estimates in the background and the injection region of the signal respectively. By this method it was found that SN R ∆ ≈ −1.1 dB for the 8 bar injections. The detection performance at lower SNRs was then investigated by superposing additional stationary background noise x bg,s onto the injection recording x raw , as was done also in a study on injection test recordings from the PFR [16] i.e.
In this case, the SNR limit is thus found by gradually increasing the superposition factor C of equation 20. The resulting min-max distances as function of SNR are shown in figure 10 . It is evident that the detectability is extremely dependent on the relative PSD shapes of background and the noise to be detected, a fact that was noted and demonstrated also in [15] . Also, the background noise adding procedure used above gradually masks non-stationary fluctuations and creates a more stationary background which is deteriorating HMM detector performance for the 8 bar injection signals. We still found that these signals were detected also for a background noise that was increased by an additional 9 dB stationary noise. Taking into account the SN R ∆ this would correspond to an additive SNR of about -10 dB.
False alarm rate and detector demonstration
The false alarm rate of a fault detection system for use in a large power plant should be very low. A value of one false alarm per two years, corresponding to 10 −8 per second has previously been suggested [18] . Since we have set the discriminant output frequency to 1 Hz, this value also corresponds to a rate of 10 −8 per discriminant sample. The HMM10233 detector was first applied to the pure background noise signals of recording 1. The responses (log conditional probabilities) on all sensors are shown in figure 11 . Based on the general appearance of this response we will make the hypothesis that the detector output distribution is given by a superposition of one stationary distribution and one distribution of impulsive events. To set a detection threshold for the stationary part, the following procedure was applied: As the output represents probabilities, the response outside of the impulsive events regions was fitted to a beta distribution. To be able to do so for these extremely small values, expressed on logarithmic scale, the following scaling relation was used, denoting the HMM log conditional probability output
where K was a large constant. Then, the scaled output D(m) was fitted to a beta distribution and a threshold corresponding to a false alarm rate of 10
per sample was found by inspection of the cumulative distribution function. The obtained threshold was then inverse scaled back to the output region of d HM M (m). The same was done on all five sensor channels. The typical output level of d HM M (m) was around -150 for all channels when applied to a raw signal with Nyquist frequency of 12.8 kHz. The constant K was set to 10 54 and the resulting thresholds ranged from -307 to -316, indicating robustness of the approach.
Due to impulsive events in the background noise, in total 5 false alarms on the 5 * 500 = 2500 discriminant samples were observed, corresponding to a false alarm rate of about 0.002 per second. This value is clearly far above the theoretical value of 10 −8 per second. As none of the impulsive events lasted longer than 1 second and they seem to have little or no correlation with eachother, imposing a requirement of e.g. three consecutive threshold crossings for alarm, would also yield a false alarm rate of 0.002 3 ≈ 10 −8 also in the impulsive events regions of the signal.
The HMM10233 was then applied to the signal from sensor 1 for frequencies Figure 11 : HMM discriminants on recording 1 (having a Nyquist frequency of 12.8 kHz). The HMM training region is indicated by a rectangle. up to 12.8 kHz. As more modern alternatives to the thresholding procedure described exist, it could be of interest to benchmark it with one of these. To do this, we will use a so-called Cusum algorithm. The interested reader is referred to [9] for details as only a brief recapitulation of the approach will be given here. We first normalize the discriminant to have zero mean and variance one in its training region. The normalized HMM10233 discriminant is shown in the upper panel of figure 12 . Noise changes which are judged to be due to argon bubbles circulating in the secondary circuit are visible abundantly after the first injection. To avoid detecting these bubbles in this case we set the threshold at -500 for the normalized discriminant. We then create the cumulative sum
where d n is the normalized discriminant. The resulting s n signal is shown in the middle panel of figure 12 . To s n , we then apply a V-mask with slope k = 500 and upper threshold h = 100. The slope parameter was set to correspond directly to the threshold for the normalized discriminant while the h parameter was tuned to avoid false alarms between injections. A change is detected when the boundary of the V-mask intersects with s n . The resulting detection signals for this procedure together with that of the three consecutive threshold crossings approach are shown in the lower panel of figure 12 . The detection delays (counted from the true injection starts) are given in table 3. It is clear that the Cusum and V-mask is able to decrease the response time compared to the thresholding approach. It was finally verified that the Cusum and V-mask approach did not produce any false alarms when applied to the pure background noise recording. The HMM10233 was also applied to the full injection test recordings (2-6) for all sensors and using full frequency data up to a Nyquist frequency of 25.6 kHz, resulting in the responses shown in figure 13.
Discussion
It is of importance to note that neither the ratio of driving argon pressure to the ambient pressure in the sodium line, nor the injector size were in these tests representative for a small leak. It has been demonstrated that apart from a low frequency whistle, the proposed acoustic leak detector here basically works as a bubble detector. A realistic small leak (around 1 g/s) would occur through a smaller orifice and with a higher pressure ratio since the secondary side of a steam generator is pressurized at 34-165 bar [1] . The aeroacoustic noise from such a leak will therefore be higher, both in terms of frequency and power, than the injections performed here [10] , while the volume of bubbles produced will be smaller. Since the high detectability of the white Gaussian noise signal is due to significant content in the high frequency region, where plant noise is relatively low, one could assume that real leaks would be detected with performance similar to the one of this testing signal.
For the sodium-nitrogen heat exchanger developed by the CEA, the allowed detection delay can be extended to around one minute [14] , thus making it likely that the proposed method will be sufficient for this application. In this case, using argon as a proxy for real nitrogen leaks is probably justifiable as both gases do not react chemically with sodium. For any unbuilt reactor system however, methods for reliable estimation of the acoustic SNR conditions of a small leak are however lacking. Also, if the detection system is required to function during operating point changes and transients, further development is also necessary. As the HMM concept is originally developed for classification of several different noise sequences (such as different words in speech recognition), it should be well suited also for this task but the resulting anomaly detection performance is not evident.
The procedure of parametrizing the detector used here (one parameter at a time) is rudimentary. The aim is to show that it can be done, using only background noise and relatively basic testing signals, and still arrive at a detector that performs well on real injection data. As stated in section 4.2, the procedure could be improved by using more testing signals and a response surface method to find an optimal model. The parameter study is however time-consuming (on the order of several hours on the laptop computer used in this work) but in a real plant, it is reasonable to assume it needs to be performed only at first start-up. Re-training of the detector might have to be performed more often but should only take one or two minutes based on the computation times observed here.
The hidden Markov model approach presented in [8] and in this work represents a novel way of calculating a change detection discriminant for acoustic fault detection in industrial systems, notably the sodium fast reactor. Further study on this discriminant, focusing on characterization of its distribution would allow optimized detection using modern methods based e.g. on Cusum type algorithms, c.f. [9] , especially since the output of the calculation of equation 6 is a logarithmic probability, as used in the likelihood ratio.
Conclusions
A hidden Markov model method proposed earlier for passive acoustic leak detection in sodium fast reactor systems has been improved in order to clarify how to set all free model parameters and to allow smaller amounts of training data. The improved method is verified to work well in a full power noise environment recorded during argon injection tests in the Phénix plant. The method is based on training a model on known background noise, i.e. without any assumptions on possible leak noise, and the free parameters of the model are set by a parametric study of detection performance for synthetic noises superposed on pure background noise. The method may thus also serve as a general fault detection method.
The false alarm rate is governed not only by the detection method used, but also by the noise of the plant. For the 5x10 minutes of pure background noise studied here, the only sources of false alarms were impulsive events lasting about one second. By assuming an allowed acquisition time of e.g. 3 seconds, it was thereby estimated that a false alarm rate close to the theoretical value of 10 −8
per output sample, can be achieved on a single sensor channel. Regarding the minimum signal to noise ratio for detection, it has been shown that the 8 bar injection signals can be detected at conditions corresponding to an additive SNR of at least -10 dB. These results seem reasonable compared to the conclusions of [16] , and [8] which were not based on realistic background noise and where the former work suffered from a lack of data preventing a credible false alarm rate estimation.
Possible ways of improving passive acoustic detector performance further would be to specifically monitor high-frequency regions where background noise can be expected to be relatively low (if leak noise can be expected in this region). Multi-sensor methods using adaptive filtering and/or spatial focalisation techniques such as beamforming also represent possibilities for further improvement.
In order to increase the maturity of this research field further, it is also of interest to study methods for estimating SNR conditions of leaks in a given system and to develop detection methods that will work also during operating point changes. Finally, even if the method proposed here is independent on knowledge on possible leak noise, such knowledge will remain of large interest to motivate monitoring of particular frequency regions and thereby increase performance further if needed.
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